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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
"The intention . . is a vital part of the contract." And Brotherhood
of Railroad Trainment v. Adams (Mo., 1928), 5 S. W. (2d) 96, 98, sets out
the rule that parties may agree that their contract be governed by the laws
of a certain state or country, and that such contracts will be recognized and
enforced in other states, notwithstanding the fact that contrary rules of
law may prevail in the state asked to enforce the obligation.
In conclusion, if any prediction may be made as to Missouri's position on
what law should govern contracts made in one state, performable elsewhere,
it is that the law of the place of making will govern, unless we find an ex-
pression of a contrary intent. Missouri does not purport to adopt the
autonomy doctrine, although the results of its decisions tend in that direc-
tion. In fact, the principal case quotes from the Restatement, which de-
cidedly rejects the autonomy doctrine and rather follows the view that the
law of the place of making (lex celebrationis) should govern. But as noted
before, it ties a string to the Restatement rule, in adding "absent proof of a
contrary intention of the parties," which virtually has the effect of re-
pudiating the very rule set forth. D. A. M., '29.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER-PERMITTING
PRBSIDENT TO INCREASE OR DECREASE RATES OF DuTY.Plaintiff company
made an importation of barium dioxide which the collector of customs as-
sessed at a rate higher than that fixed by statute, the rate having been
raised by proclamation of the President issued by virtue of Sec. 315 of
Title III of the Tariff Act of September 21, 1922, 42 Stat. 858, 19 U. S. C.
154-156. Held, Congress did not unconstitutionally delegate its legislative
power by imposing upon the President the duty of determining with the
aid of advisers, differences in cost of production here and abroad and mak-
ing such increases and decreases in rates of duty as were found necessary
to equalize costs of production. Hampton & Co. v. U. S. (1928), 72 L. Ed.
(Adv.) 448, 48 S. Ct. 448.
A legislative body may not delegate its powers, but may authorize an
executive officer to carry out legislation which it has adopted. The Aurora
v. U. S. (1813), 7 Cranch 382, 3 L. Ed. 378; State of Minnesota ex rel.
Railroad and Warehouse Commission v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co.
(1888), 38 Minn. 281, 37 N. W. 782. In the latter case the court states:
"The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law,
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and the con-
ferring an authority or discretion to be exercised under and in pursuance of
the law."
In United States v. Grimaud (1911), 220 U. S. 506, 55 L. Ed. 563, 31 S.
Ct. 480 the legislative power was held not to be unconstitutionally delegated
to the Secretary of Agriculture by the Forest Reserve Acts making criminal
the violation of the rules and regulations covering forest reservations, made
and promulgated by him under authority of those statutes. In U. S. v.
Stephens (1918), 247 U. S. 504, 62 L. Ed. 1239, 38 S. Ct. 579 it was held
that the Selective Draft Act of May 18, 1917, declaring the President au-
thorized to raise an army was not a delegation of the power vested in Con-
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gress to raise an army but merely to commit to him execution of its scheme.
In Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark (1892), 143 U. S. 649, 36 L. Ed. 294, 12
S. Ct. 495 a statutory provision was held constitutional which authorized
the President to suspend free importation of specified products if a foreign
country did not deal reciprocally. Such statutes are based on the imprac-
ticability of legislative action on details, and the necessity of adjustments
to maintain established principles in the face of varying conditions.
But the legislature, in invoking the aid of the executive, must not leave
too great a field for the exercise of executive discretion. Thus an act em-
powering the director of agriculture to declare oranges unfit for shipment
when frosted to the extent of endangering the reputation of the industry
has been held void as delegating to an administrative officer the legislative
power of determining what acts or omissions of an individual are unlawful.
Ex parte Peppers (1922), 189 Cal. 682, 209 P. 896. In Tarpey v. McClure
(1923), 190 Cal. 593, 213 P. 983 it was held that the creation of a water
storage district is a legislative act, performance of which may not be dele-
gated by the legislature to an executive or judicial officer. The statute or
ordinance must not purport to vest arbitrary discretion in the executive, but
must prescribe definite rules for his guidance. City of Shreveport v. Hern-
don (1925), 159 La. 113, 105 S. 244; Tarpey v. McClure, supra.
It is to be noted that the statute in the principal case outlines certain rules
of decision to guide the executive, and does not leave to him arbitrary dis-
cretion in executing the law. It therefore has solid basis in constitutional-
ity as not being a delegation of legislative power. S. E., '30.
CRIMINAL LAW-KIDNAPPING-INTENT.-A divorce decree awarded
custody of a minor child to her stepmother, and later the husband, who was
the father of the child by a former marriage, not knowing of the decree,
took the child and carried her away. Held, that such taking out of the
custody of the person having lawful charge of the child without the consent
of such custodian, and with the intent to detain and conceal the child, is
sufficient to sustain an indictment for kidnapping; and that the fact that
the defendant had no personal knowledge of the decree awarding the cus-
tody of the child only can be evidence that the defendant did not intend to
detain or conceal the child from the person having lawful custody, and if
he did so intend it would be no defense if he did not know that the custody
of the child had been awarded to the stepmother. State v. Taylor (Kans.,
1928), 264 P. 1069.
At common law kidnapping was defined as the forcible abduction or
stealing away of man, woman, or child from his own country and sending
him to another. 4 Blackstone COMmENTARIES 219. The definition has been
modified so that the carrying away need not be to another country. State
v. Rollins (1837), 8 N. H. 550. Kidnapping is false imprisonment, coupled
with the idea of abduction. Click v. State (1848), 3 Tex. 282. The gen-
eral rule is that a parent who takes his own child can never be guilty of
kidnapping unless he takes this child without the consent of a person to
whom the child's custody has been awarded by the decree of a competent
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